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IN THE AGE OF HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
MARK K. BREWER†
I. INTRODUCTION
An ever-increasing body of literature seeks to define, justify, and
influence the purpose of a corporation, fueling a battle between propo-
nents of shareholder value theory1 on the one hand and those arguing
for a broader view of the corporation and its stakeholders (“stake-
holder theory”) on the other hand.  The manner in which law defines,
depicts, and measures a corporation is of acute importance where laws
and regulations struggle to keep pace with technology and innovation.
Over the past few years, the production of unconventional gas2
trapped in deep underground rock layers has become an increasingly
important source of energy in the United States3 and may have a simi-
lar potential in the United Kingdom.4  Hydraulic fracturing (com-
monly called “fracking”) is a process by which large quantities of
water, sand, or other propping agent and chemicals are pumped un-
derground to break apart rock layers to release shale gas.5  Environ-
mental hazards include gas leaking into the atmosphere,6 gas or
contaminants from wells or fractures seeping into aquifers, and sur-
† Assistant Dean, Sheffield Business School, Sheffield Hallam University,
United Kingdom; BA, Samford University; MLLP, Humboldt Universita¨t zu Berlin; JD,
Cornell University; PhD, University of St. Andrews.
1. This Article will generally use the phrase “shareholder value theory” to denote
the concept that directors must act in the best interest of the shareholders, although
other literature assigns the terms “shareholder value maximization theory” or “share-
holder primacy theory.”
2. The phrase “unconventional gas” refers to shale gas, coal bed methane, and
underground coal gasification.
3. Russell Gold, Fracking Gives U.S. Energy Boom Plenty of Room to Run, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 14, 2014, 5:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fracking-gives-u-s-en-
ergy-boom-plenty-of-room-to-run-1410728682.
4. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS
FOR 2040 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf.
5. T. J. GALLEGOS, B. A. VARELA, S. S. HAINES, & M. A. ENGLE, HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING WATER USE VARIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPLICATIONS 5839 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4758395/pdf/
WRCR-51-5839.pdf.
6. Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge to Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Green-
house Gas Footprint of Natural Gas, 2 ENERGY SCI. & ENG’G 47, 47-50 (2014).
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face spills of contaminated water.7  While the practice has been used
for decades,8 discovery of significant reserves, coupled with improved
technology, has propelled the hydraulic fracturing industry in the
United States into an unparalleled source of energy.9  Although avail-
able data suggests the United Kingdom only possesses moderate shale
gas reserves, hydraulic fracturing could potentially contribute to a sig-
nificant number of jobs in areas of high unemployment, provide a
source of tax revenue, and reduce the cost of energy in the country.10
In both U.S. corporate law and U.K. company law (together, “Anglo-
American corporate law”11), shareholder value theory—the dominant
view in the judiciary and the academy—has inhibited higher levels of
corporate sustainability, often termed Corporate Social Responsibility
(“CSR”).  The risks associated with hydraulic fracturing illustrate the
importance of reorienting legal scholarship away from the dominance
of shareholder value theory to models that prioritize sustainability.
This Article argues the dominance of the shareholder value theory
exposes local communities to environmental and social risks by en-
couraging energy companies to seek short-term gain without address-
ing detrimental externalities for the local community, the
environment, and other stakeholders.  Although stricter and more
streamlined regulation is desirable, this Article argues that Anglo-
American corporate law itself must be more responsive to CSR as well
as support other initiatives to improve corporate behavior.  This Arti-
cle initially presents the legal background relevant to hydraulic frac-
turing in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Union.  Then, the Article outlines the risks that the hydraulic fractur-
ing industry presents, including water contamination, greenhouse gas
emissions, stress on local communities, and other issues.  Next, the
Article explains the debate between the shareholder value theory and
the stakeholder theory and its impact on the hydraulic fracturing in-
7. GALLEGOS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5843.
8. See generally Jason Schumacher & Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal Landscape of
‘Fracking’: The Oil and Gas Industry’s Game-Changing Technique Is Its Biggest Hurdle,
17 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2012-2013).  The authors note that the first horizontal
well was completed in 1929, and since the 1940s, the process has been regularly used.
Id.
9. Susan Williams, Discovering Shale Gas: An Investor Guide to Hydraulic Frac-
turing, SUSTAINABLE INV. INST. 8 (Feb. 2012), http://www.siinstitute.org/special_report
.cgi?id=21.
10. EDWARD WHITE, MIKE FELL & LOUISE SMITH, BRIEFING PAPER: SHALE GAS AND
FRACKING 8 (2015), researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2016-0018/
CBP06073.pdf.
11. While distinct legal systems, U.S. corporate and U.K. company law both share
an emphasis on shareholder primacy and wealth maximization in contrast to continen-
tal European corporate models that focus on a broader range of stakeholders.
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dustry.  Finally, the Article presents recommendations for addressing
problems facing the industry with respect to deficiencies in the law.
II. BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Conventional oil and gas are found in permeable rocks, including
sandstone.12  Shale gas, however, is contained in impermeable shale,
which requires fracturing in order to release the trapped gas.13  The
product of hydraulic fracturing is natural gas, which, while cleaner
than other fossil fuels, still contributes to carbon emissions.14  Oil
companies in the United States and elsewhere have aggressively em-
ployed hydraulic fracturing over the past few years as more accessible
carbon fuels have been depleted and extraction technology has im-
proved.15  In July 2014, the British Department of Energy and Cli-
mate Change (“DECC”) began receiving applications for licenses to
engage in hydraulic fracturing in the United Kingdom and announced
the successful bids in 2015.16
A. REGULATORY STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES
As the purpose of this Article is to examine the possible influence
of corporate law on hydraulic fracturing activities, an extended discus-
sion of environmental regulation is outside the scope of this research;
however, an overview of the regulatory landscape provides the back-
ground for this Article’s main discussion.  Over the past few years, the
hydraulic fracturing industry has grown exponentially in the United
States.17  Although a patchwork of federal and state regulations ad-
dresses hydraulic fracturing in the United States, there is no compre-
hensive regulatory regime at the federal level.18  While Congress may
claim authority to regulate the industry under the Commerce Clause,
individual states have generally governed the most important is-
12. Developing Onshore Shale Gas and Oil—Facts About ‘Fracking,’ U.K. Dep’t En-
ergy & Climate Change (Dec. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/265972/Developing_Onshore_Shale_Gas_and_Oil__Facts
_about_Fracking_131213.pdf [hereinafter Facts About Fracking].
13. Id.
14. Howarth, supra note 6, at 47-50.
15. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 241.
16. JEANNE DELEBARRE, ELENA ARES & LOUISE SMITH, SHALE GAS AND FRACKING 15
(2017), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06073/SN06073.pdf.
17. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 241.
18. Id. at 260.
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sues,19 including drilling process integrity, well location, and fractur-
ing chemical disclosure.20
The hydraulic fracturing industry enjoys exemptions from a num-
ber of federal regulatory regimes, including, inter alia, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act21 (“RCRA”), the Safe Drinking Water
Act22 (“SDWA”), the Clean Water Act23 (“CWA”), and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act24 (“EPCRA”).  First,
RCRA requires parties treating, storing, or disposing of toxic waste to
comply with strict technical and financial guidelines.  Although frack-
ing fluids typically contain trace elements subject to RCRA regulation,
Congress exempted oil and gas waste through the Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Act Amendments of 1980,25 which resulted in less stringent stor-
age requirements.26  Second, Congress enacted the Solid Waste
Disposal Act27 (“SDWA”) in 1965 to safeguard surface and under-
ground water sources that are actually or potentially available for
human consumption.  Through the Energy Policy Act of 2005,28 Con-
gress exempted the hydraulic fracturing industry from regulatory re-
quirements under the SDWA, which safeguards drinking water
aquifers through its technical and reporting requirements to prevent
contamination.29  Third, the CWA regulates the disposal of waste-
water as well as the adoption of measures to prevent pollution in
storm water discharges.30  Fourth, the EPCRA is designed to help pro-
tect communities from chemical hazards that could threaten public
health, the environment, and safety.31  However, firms that engage in
fracking currently are not required to comply with the EPCRA’s re-
quirement to submit annual reports (i.e., “Toxic Chemical Release
Form”) relating to toxic chemicals to the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”).32
Congressional attempts to regulate the industry on a federal level
have largely failed.  On June 9, 2009, Dianna DeGette, Maurice
19. Id. at 242.
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974).
23. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
24. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986).
25. Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980).
26. 40 C.F.R. § 243.200-1(a) (2002).
27. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965).
28. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (2005).
30. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/water-en-
forcement#cwa (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
31. Id.
32. William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the
United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government and Varying
State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 48 (2012).
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Hinchey, and Jared Polis introduced the Fracturing Responsibility
and Awareness of Chemicals Act33 (“FRAC Act”) in the House of Rep-
resentatives while Bob Casey and Chuck Schumer concurrently intro-
duced the FRAC Act in the Senate.  The FRAC Act would recognize
hydraulic fracturing as a federally regulated activity under the SDWA,
which would require hydraulic fracturing firms to disclose the chemi-
cals in hydraulic fracturing fluid.  After the 111th Congress adjourned
without passing the FRAC Act in January 2011, Bob Casey and Diana
DeGette reintroduced it in March 2011 in the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, although it did not pass.  Currently not
passed, the FRAC Act was reintroduced on June 11, 2013.34  From
March 2010, the EPA engaged in a multiyear study of a number of
well sites throughout the United States and published an interim re-
port in 2012 that detailed the extent of the study.35  In 2016, the EPA
released its final report examining the impact of hydraulic fracturing
on the quality and volume of drinking water resources.36
Beyond meeting any relevant federal thresholds, states37 enjoy
discretion to regulate hydraulic fracturing as they see fit, which has
resulted in a lack of uniformity nationally with some states granting
their respective environmental agency independent authority while
others allow regulation through their respective processes of granting
well permits.38  Currently, Vermont,39 New York,40 and Maryland41
have all banned hydraulic fracturing.  Other states, such as Texas and
Louisiana, have assigned regulatory authority to a particular state
agency.  For example, in Texas, the Oil and Gas Division of the Texas
Railroad Commission has the authority to grant permits for hydraulic
fracturing42 while the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
Office of Conservation has authority in Louisiana.43
33. H.R. REP. NO. 1084 (2009); S. REP. NO. 587 (2009).
34. S. REP. NO. 1135 (2013).
35. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND
GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RE-
SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (FINAL REPORT) (2016).
36. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 30.
37. A comprehensive review of state regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.
For a summary of such regulation, see Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 280-
300.
38. Brady & Crannell, supra note 32, at 53.
39. See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. XXIX, § 571(a) (West 2017).
40. See N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HY-
DRAULIC FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 3 (2015), http://www.health.ny.gov/
press/reports/docs/high_volume_hydraulic_fracturing.pdf.
41. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 14-107.1 (West 2017).
42. Brady & Crannell, supra note 32, at 60-61.
43. Id. at 61-62.
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B. U.K. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
As in the United States, a number of different bodies exert influ-
ence on the fracking industry in the United Kingdom.  The Depart-
ment of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”),
previously the DECC, has the authority to grant permission for frack-
ing44 with the same process for obtaining permission for drilling as
that of conventional and unconventional gas.45  The Oil and Gas Au-
thority is responsible for issuing licenses.46  If required, the operator
must complete an environmental-impact assessment.47  In addition,
the regional Environmental Agency must grant the appropriate per-
mits to the operator.48  The operator must also notify the Health and
Safety Executive of the well design and plans for operation.49  The op-
erator must ensure that an independent well examiner conducts a
complete examination of the well’s design and construction.50  Fur-
ther, the operator must obtain planning permission from the Minerals
Planning Authority, local council, or the equivalent.51  Under the
Water Resources Act of 1991, the operator must serve notification of
intention to drill to the Environment Agency.52  Additionally, the op-
erator must apply for consent to drill from the DECC as well as in-
clude a hydraulic fracturing plan and advise the British Geological
Survey.  In December 2012, the British Government set up the Office
of Unconventional Gas and Oil within the DECC to be responsible for
“the safe, responsible, and environmentally sound recovery of the
U.K.’s unconventional reserves of gas and oil.”53  Following the en-
44. See generally, Guidance on Fracking: Developing Shale Gas in the UK, DEP’T
BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/pub-
lications/about-shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturing-fracking/developing-shale-oil-and-
gas-in-the-uk [hereinafter Guidance on Fracking].
45. The precise regulatory framework is summarized by the Department of Busi-
ness, Energy and Industry. See Roadmap: Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration in the U.K.
Regulation and Best Practice, DEP’T BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY (Dec. 17, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulatory-roadmap-onshore-oil-and-gas-
exploration-in-the-uk-regulation-and-best-practice (last updated Mar. 14, 2018) [herein-
after Roadmap]; Onshore Oil and Gas Exploration in the UK: Regulation and Best Prac-
tice, DEP’T BUS., ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, (Dec. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/. . ./
Onshore_UK_oil_and_gas_exploration_England_Dec15.pdf [hereinafter Regulation &
Best Practice] (setting forth the framework in greater detail).




50. See Regulation & Best Practice, supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. OFF. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS & OIL (OUGO), https://www.gov.uk/government/
policy-teams/office-of-unconventional-gas-and-oil-ougo (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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dorsement of the House of Lords,54 the BEIS began awarding licenses
with the latest announced on July 25, 2017.55
C. EUROPEAN UNION DEVELOPMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS
Recent European Union measures regulate the development of
the hydraulic fracturing industry in Europe.  The Commission Recom-
mendation of January 22, 2014 sets forth “the minimum principles”
applicable to member states that permit hydraulic fracturing, includ-
ing requirements for assessments of the impact on the environment
and human health, a system of permits for exploration and produc-
tion, and risk assessments of the impact on groundwater or the area of
the installation.56  These minimum principles also require an environ-
mental (baseline) study on the condition of the installation site prior
to operations, installation design and construction that prevents leaks
and spills, and development and infrastructure that minimize envi-
ronmental and health risks.57  Further, the measures require compa-
nies to use best techniques and practices in their operations, to use
minimal water and hazardous chemicals, to monitor environmental
impacts regularly, and to guarantee their ability to cover liability for
potential hazards.58  Finally, the minimum principles require proper
administrative oversight by the member states, an examination of the
environmental status of the installation site and its surroundings
upon closure, and dissemination of information to the public concern-
ing chemical substances and amounts of water used as well as regular
and prompt publication of the volume of activity and incidents or
violations.59
III. RISKS THAT THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING INDUSTRY
PRESENTS
In the United States, the current lack of comprehensive federal
regulatory oversight60 and the lack of uniformity in state and local
regulation61 leave many communities at risk for water contamina-
54. ECON. AFFAIRS COMM., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON UK ENERGY POLICY OF SHALE
GAS AND OIL, 2013-14, HL (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ld-
select/ldeconaf/172/172.pdf.
55. See Licensing Authority, OIL & GAS AUTHORITY, https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/
licensing-consents/licensing-rounds/ (last updated July 27, 2016).
56. THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION OF 22 JANUARY 2014 ON
MINIMUM PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBONS (SUCH




60. Brady and Crannell, supra note 32, at 43.
61. Id. at 53.
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tion62 and may expose the atmosphere to unacceptable levels of meth-
ane.63  As the United Kingdom has limited experience with hydraulic
fracturing to release shale gas, it is too early to state with certainty
the precise problems that the industry will encounter, although Brit-
ish environmental groups express similar concerns to those in the
United States.64  While a comprehensive discussion of the environ-
mental and social risks associated with hydraulic fracturing is beyond
the scope of this Article, the following summarizes the most serious
risks.
A. WATER CONTAMINATION
Much of the criticism of hydraulic fracturing relates to potential
contamination of local water supplies.65  Depending on the type of
rock formation, the EPA has suggested that hydraulic fracturing re-
quires between 50,000 to 350,000 gallons of water for drilling through
coal formations and two to five million gallons for horizontal drilling
through shale formations.66  The so-called “flowback,” i.e., the water
and other substances recovered from the well, must be disposed prop-
erly.67  Concerns have been raised about the “integrity of wellbores,
the possibility of leaks through faulty cement casings as the well
passes through the water table, and the possibility of migration of gas
or contaminants from the fractured well into the drinking water sup-
ply.”68  Recent studies have documented elevated levels of chemicals
such as bromide and radium in treated water from hydraulic
fracturing.69
In the United States, fluids used in hydraulic fracturing contain
approximately 98% to 99.2% water, with the remainder including a
combination of chemicals, some of which may be toxic.70  U.S. legal
62. GALLEGOS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5843.
63. Howarth, supra note 6, at 47-50.
64. VERONIKA MOORE, ALISON BERESFORD & BENEDICT GOVE, HYDRAULIC FRACTUR-
ING FOR SHALE GAS IN THE UK: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE FOR POTENTIAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACTS 45 (2014), https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/shale_gas_report_evidence_tcm
9-365779.pdf.
65. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 243.
66. However, these estimates may overestimate the amount of water required due
to improvements in technology. See generally Heather Cooley & Kristina Donnelly, Hy-
draulic Fracturing and Water Resources: Separating the Frack from the Fiction, PAC.
INST. (2012), https://www.pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2013/02/full_report25
.pdf.
67. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 244.
68. Id. at 244.
69. See generally Nathaniel R. Warner, Cidney A. Christie, Robert B. Jackson &
Avner Vengosh, Impact of Shale Gas Wastewater Disposal on Water Quality in Western
Pennsylvania, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 11849 (2013).
70. Chemical Use In Hydraulic Fracturing, FRACFOCUS, http://fracfocus.org/water-
protection/drilling-usage (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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efforts to address concerns on water quality have largely focused on
disclosure.71  A number of states, including Wyoming, Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, Texas, Colorado, New Mexico, Montana, West Virginia,
Idaho, and North Dakota have some form of public disclosure require-
ment for hazardous chemicals.  Additionally, FracFocus acts as a na-
tional hydraulic fracturing chemical registry.72  Managed by the
Ground Water Protection Council and Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission, FracFocus provides the public information concerning
the chemicals used for hydraulic fracturing for particular geographic
areas.73  While a focus on disclosure can help raise awareness of po-
tential risks, it has its limitations as a regulatory tool.  In other areas
of the law, scholars have criticized disclosure-based regulation be-
cause it has failed to prevent significant harm.74  For example, the
securities industry, underpinned by disclosure-based regulation, has
been dominated by cyclical financial crises precipitated by corporate
behavior that eluded regulators and that were unaddressed by a dis-
closure-based regime.75  Moreover, Professor Jason Schumacher and
Professor Jennifer Morrissey argue that “[e]ven where there are dis-
closure requirements, there are other issues ranging from perceived
loopholes in existing regulatory schemes to the ability of state envi-
ronmental regulators in gas-boom regions to adequately handle the
ever-increasing number of permit requests.”76
In contrast to the disclosure-based system in the United States,
the United Kingdom has taken a stronger regulatory approach to en-
suring U.K. water quality.  According to a recent House of Lords Eco-
nomic Affairs Select Committee report, U.K. law and practice should
eliminate the main issues that contribute to water contamination
given the existence of rules that require the disclosure of chemicals in
fracking fluids as well as the prohibition of certain hazardous sub-
stances in the hydraulic fracturing process.77  Despite the strong ap-
proach, the same report conditions its conclusion on the premise that
71. Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16127 (Jun.
24, 2015) (codified at 80 C.F.R. § 3160).
72. FRACFOCUS, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2007).
75. See generally Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of
Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling
Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbro-
kers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996).
76. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 249.
77. ECON. AFFAIRS COMM., supra note 54.
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regulators must enforce these prohibitions so that “hydraulic fractur-
ing fluid poses no risk to groundwater in the U.K.”78
Beyond the risk of contamination by flowback and surface water,
the integrity of wells has raised concerns among scientists.79  In the
United States, states generally regulate the integrity of wellbores,80
although the industry has developed a number of “best practices” as it
increases its self-policing.81  In the United Kingdom, Professor Rich-
ard J. Davies and others report that among the 2,152 onshore hydro-
carbon wells drilled onshore between 1902 and 2013, 65.2% are
probably not visible because “UK regulations state that, after aban-
donment, the well should be sealed and cut and the land reclaimed.”82
Despite the relatively limited data indicating problems with the integ-
rity of wellbores in the United Kingdom,83 “well integrity failure may
be more widespread than the presently limited data show” since “mon-
itoring of abandoned wells does not take place in the UK (or any other
jurisdiction) and less visible pollutants such as methane leaks are un-
likely to be reported.”84
B. NATURAL GAS AND GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS
While natural gas may be widely regarded as a “clean fuel,” it is a
fossil fuel and produces carbon dioxide when combusted.85  Moreover,
leaks during extraction and distribution further contribute to the re-
lease of methane and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere,
which is notable, as Professor Robert W. Howarth points out that
“[m]ethane is far more effective at trapping heat in the atmosphere
than is carbon dioxide, and so even small rates of methane emission
can have a large influence on . . . greenhouse gas footprints. . . .”86  In
addition, the use of drilling equipment involved in well construction
and gas extraction as well as emissions from the transport of water
78. Id.
79. Richard J. Davies et al., Oil and Gas Wells and Their Integrity: Implications for
Shale and Unconventional Resource Exploitation, 56 MARINE & PETROLEUM GEOLOGY
239, 239 (2014).
80. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 244.
81. Id. at 245.
82. Davies et al., supra note 79, at 252.
83. Id.  Davies and the others note that “[o]nly [two] wells in the UK have recorded
well integrity failure (Hatfield Blowout and Singleton Oil Field) but this figure is based
only on data that were publicly available or accessible through UK Environment Agency
and only out of the minority of UK wells which were active.” Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally JOHN BRODERICK ET AL., SHALE GAS: AN UPDATED ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS (2011), http://www.mace.manchester.ac
.uk/media/eps/schoolofmechanicalaerospaceandcivilengineering/newsandevents/news/
research/pdfs2011/shale-gas-threat-report.pdf.
86. Howarth, supra note 6, at 47.
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necessary for hydraulic fracturing further contribute to airborne pol-
lution.87  Moreover, focusing energy policy on natural gas will ulti-
mately detract from the development of renewable energy sources
such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric power.
According to Professor Joshua P. Fershee, an examination of prac-
tices in the State of North Dakota indicates that “risky portions of the
process are not well monitored . . .” as regulators do “not have the
resources to conduct the currently expected level of oversight.”88
Wells that are idle, abandoned, or orphaned present particularly diffi-
cult challenges, especially where the operator has become bankrupt.
As discussed above, since few, if any, jurisdictions require the moni-
toring of abandoned oil and gas wells, leaks of methane and other pol-
lutants are unlikely to be reported.89  Current laws are deferential to
oil and gas companies and offer little guidance in terms of best prac-
tices.  Accordingly, poorly regulated-and-monitored operations have
the potential to contribute significantly to the emission of greenhouse
gases.  As Professor Davies and others report, “[i]t is important . . .
that the appropriate financial and monitoring processes are in place,
particularly after well abandonment, so that legacy issues associated
with the drilling of wells for shale gas and oil are minimized.”90
C. IMPACT OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT ON LOCAL HOST COMMUNITIES
While many emphasize the economic benefits and reduced envi-
ronmental damage associated with hydraulic fracturing compared to
other forms of carbon fuels, the impact on the local host community
can be devastating.91  Rapid development on local communities with-
out adequate planning and infrastructure may lead to “overburdened
transportation and health infrastructure, and disproportionate in-
creases in social problems, particularly in small isolated rural commu-
nities . . . .”92  While increased standards of living among some
residents may benefit communities financially, Professor Fershee has
argued that a sudden influx of wealth may have an adverse effect on
the social fabric of the host communities, creating “boomtown
problems”93 with “increased levels of drug use, domestic violence, and
prostitution”94 as well as “increased incidence of sexually-transmitted
87. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 251.
88. Joshua P. Fershee, North Dakota Expertise: A Chance to Lead in Economically
and Environmentally Sustainable Hydraulic Fracturing, 87 N.D. L. REV. 485, 498
(2011).
89. Davies et al., supra note 79, at 252.
90. Id.
91. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 40.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 53.
94. Fershee, supra note 88, at 494.
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diseases . . . [and] acute housing shortages . . . .”95  Scarcity of housing
may exacerbate socioeconomic inequality as it “creates tremendous op-
portunities for landlords and other landowners, but it creates hard-
ship for many of those not working in the oil industry trying to remain
in the region.”96  Local communities have experienced “significant in-
frastructure damage in some localities due to increased truck traf-
fic . . .”97 as well as traffic jams and dramatic increases in road
accidents and fatalities.98  In the United Kingdom, legal title to min-
eral rights may prevent many local communities from directly benefit-
ting from exploitation of shale gas deposits, although the government
has introduced guidelines to address such concerns, such as authoriz-
ing local payments for drilling in those areas.99
D. OTHER ISSUES
Stakeholders have raised additional concerns including seismic
activity and land-use issues.  Although the limited amounts of water
used in hydraulic fracturing are insufficient to produce significant
tremors, injection of liquid waste may cause deep underground pres-
sure that pushes  “existing faults to ‘slip’ in response to changes in
pressure, particularly as higher pressures are required over time to
inject the waste as the underground reservoir fills up.”100  Despite the
lack of consensus, Professor Schumacher and Professor Morrissey
note that “there is mounting evidence of increased, and possibly in-
duced, seismic events in areas where natural gas production has in-
creased and . . . which also involves the injection of large volumes of
fluids into the ground.”101
IV. SHAREHOLDER VALUE THEORY/STAKEHOLDER THEORY
DEBATE AND ITS IMPACT
While the complex patchwork of local and national laws and rules
provide various levels of protection for local communities, exposing
some to greater risks than others, some aspects of the law are also
complicit in creating potentially greater risks and more widespread
harm.  In particular, the law promotes corporate interests above those
of other stakeholders.  This Article will initially address the overall
threat of the systemic problems created by law itself and then ad-
dresses specific threats in particular.
95. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 40, at 53.
96. Fershee, supra note 88, at 493.
97. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 40, at 55.
98. Fershee, supra note 88, at 494.
99. Facts About Fracking, supra note 12, at 8.
100. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 252-53.
101. Id. at 253.
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In the absence of coordinated action to establish effective, compre-
hensive regulations for hydraulic fracturing, it is fundamental that
corporate law and the judiciary balance economic considerations and
sustainable behavior by fracking firms.  Yet, the Anglo-American con-
cept of a corporation is dominated by shareholder value theory102 that
inadequately takes into account the impact of corporations on the en-
vironment, the local community, and other stakeholders.103  Alterna-
tive models that seek to promote CSR may play an important role in
managing such externalities.  Nonetheless, the law continues to limit
the positive impact CSR may have since it has institutionalized share-
holder value theory.  The following provides an overview of the theo-
retical concepts of corporations dominant in law, followed by an
examination of the limits of these models.
Since the 1930s, legal scholars104 and economists105 have at-
tempted to explain the organization and purpose of firms, developing
various models that largely focus on the rights and duties of share-
holders and directors.  At the heart of these models lies the basic ques-
tion of the purpose of a corporation.  Among the theories focusing on
the relationship between shareholders and management, two compet-
ing models have dominated scholarship, namely models that focus on
shareholder primacy/shareholder value maximization and those that
focus on stakeholder theory.106  More recently, models that stress CSR
have been promulgated, yet they have had only a limited impact on
the law and the judiciary.  The following discussion focuses on the
shareholder value theory while subsequent portions of this Article ad-
dress the necessity to incorporate CSR into the law.
Based on the assumptions of the “law and economics movement”
that originated in the United States107 and spread to Europe,108 the
shareholder value theory has dominated the economic, financial, and
102. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
856 (1997).
103. Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87,
91 (2005).
104. See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trust-
ees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
105. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
106. A. Keay, Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate Law,
39 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 358, 358 (2010).
107. See generally Kres˘imir Pirs˘l, Trends, Developments, and Mutual Influences Be-
tween United States Corporate Law(s) and European Community Law(s), 14 COLUM. J.
EUROPEAN L. 277, 278 (2007-2008).
108. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 1161, 1184-86 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
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legal109 understanding of the corporation.  The theory’s roots lie in the
pioneering work of Professor Adolf Berle and Professor Gardiner
Means,110 which relies on Berle’s depiction of managers as the trust-
ees of a company’s shareholders and therefore required to act for the
benefit of the shareholders.111  Building on these assumptions, Profes-
sor Michael Jensen and Professor William Meckling’s seminal work,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure112 depicts the shareholders and management as ra-
tional economic actors who contract with one another.113  Shareholder
value theory identifies the purpose of a corporation as explained by
Professor Milton Friedman in his frequently quoted statement: “There
is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its re-
sources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in
open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”114  Professor
Jonathan Macey also notes:
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers
and directors of both public and closely held firms owe fiduci-
ary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone.  Direc-
tors and officers are legally required to manage a corporation
for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders, and protection for
other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided by
contract.115
The interests of remaining stakeholders, including employees, the
local community, and others affected by corporate decisions are secon-
dary to shareholders, who, in the view of shareholder value theory,
have the “greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-mak-
ing.”116  According to such logic, it follows, as explained by Professor
Robert Sprague, that “[s]hareholders invest . . . with the understand-
ing that managers will strive to maximize shareholder value . . . .”117
109. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term share-
holder value.”).
110. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
111. Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1064 (1931).
112. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
113. Id. at 308-09.
114. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 124-33 (40th ed. 1962).
115. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Mak-
ing Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 23, 23 (1991).
116. Id. at 26.
117. Robert Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards for Sustain-
able Corporate Governance, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010).
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Later research has defended managerial discretion against share-
holder directives, arguing that management requires the business
judgment rule (“BJR”) in order to operate effectively.118  According to
the BJR, broad discretion should be granted to the board of directors
in evaluating its decisions on behalf of the corporation.  In addition to
the academic theoretical basis, the law and economics movement has
also pointed to seminal U.S. cases such as Dodge v. Ford,119 Schlensky
v. Wrigley,120 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.121 for authority to support the assumption that companies must
maximize immediate shareholder value at the expense of long-term
value.  The Delaware courts, the most influential judiciary in U.S. cor-
porate-law matters, has also adopted a shareholder-centric model, de-
picting directors as agents of the shareholders.122  Moreover, as
Professor Boot and Professor Macey point out, “[t]he U.S. system re-
lies on capital markets, which pressure corporate managers to deliver
profits.”123
While the majority of corporate scholars depict the corporation ex-
clusively from an economic perspective,124 Professor Reza Dibadj ar-
gues that “the laissez-faire law and economics approach . . . rests on a
remarkably shaky foundation.”125  Scholarship that depicts corpora-
tions as nothing more than “legal fictions which serves as a nexus
for . . . contracting relationships”126 fails to recognize the roles such
corporations play in society and the manner in which their stakehold-
ers exert influence over them.  Professor Leonard I. Rotman aptly
notes that “[a]lthough the apparent simplicity and definiteness of the
shareholder primacy model is attractive, it drastically oversimplifies
matters.”127  In particular, cases cited in support of shareholder value
theory, such as Dodge, are not “as absolutely dedicated to the advance-
ment of shareholder wealth maximisation as observers have generally
posited.”128  Professor Kent Greenfield notes that it is “truly awk-
ward . . . to assert that corporate managers best advance societal well-
118. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
119. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
120. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
121. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
122. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
123. Arnound W. A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance:
The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 COR-
NELL L. REV. 356, 356-93 (2004).
124. Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 313
(2009).
125. Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 477 (2005).
126. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 112, at 311.
127. Leonard I. Rotman, Debunking the “End of History” Thesis for Corporate Law,
33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 270 (2010).
128. Id. at 230.
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being by ignoring it.”129  Simply put, the outdated economic depiction
of corporations is unconvincing in its notion that a corporation is noth-
ing but a “nexus of contracts”; instead, corporations under the law are
legal creatures that enjoy both rights and responsibilities.  Moreover,
Professor Judd Sneirson argues that “[n]o corporate law statute or
court decision explicitly requires firms to adhere to the shareholder
primacy view.”130  Accordingly, shareholder value theory fails to ade-
quately address corporations as legal persons who enjoy similar rights
to natural persons and therefore should presumably have similar obli-
gations and duties to those of natural persons.  A failure to address
systematic shortcomings in corporate law institutionalizes an inequal-
ity between natural persons and corporations, encouraging reckless-
ness and unreasonable risks by corporate boards.  In particular, “a
fixation on shareholder interests will result at times in managerial
decisions that are overly risky from society’s perspective.”131  Accord-
ingly, shareholder value theory ignores the externalities that become
a public cost.
The interaction of tort, criminal, and corporate law raises further
problems.  In particular, although corporations may be held liable for
tortious conduct, their culpable behavior is the result of individuals,
and penalties routinely affect the corporation as a whole rather than
the culpable individuals.  As Professor Robert J. Rhee succinctly
notes: “Tort law finds liability; corporation law excuses it.”132  Among
the problems with this remedy, two in particular stand out.  First, the
stakeholders of the corporation all suffer from the harm caused by the
perpetrators, who are often protected from personal harm.  Second,
the concept of limited liability may encourage management to engage
in “excessive levels of risk-taking”133 that it would not pursue as indi-
vidual persons.  Given the fundamentally different nature of tort and
corporate law, “directors must not be held liable for negligent, stupid,
careless, unlucky, or egregious decisions in spite of any visceral im-
pulse to blame and levy liability for a bad outcome.”134  As company
charters routinely provide that officers and directors will be indemni-
fied from liability of corporate actions, there is no adequate means to
hold any natural person accountable for harm caused by the corpora-
tion.  This anomaly elevates corporate boards to a position no natural
129. Greenfield, supra note 103, at 100 (emphasis in the original).
130. Judd F. Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder Profits, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 550 (2011).
131. Greenfield, supra note 103, at 101.
132. Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2013).
133. Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups:  Does Cor-
porate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 136 (2013).
134. Rhee, supra note 132, at 1157.
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person enjoys: corporations routinely profit but do not suffer from
risky behavior.  Accordingly, high-risk activities may benefit the cor-
poration in the short-term if successful but result in harmful external-
ities for other stakeholders.  However, board decision-making may
involve a myriad of issues that include essentially corporate matters,
such as mergers and acquisitions, but also may include far-reaching
policies and actions that affect the environment, local communities,
and other stakeholders.  Increasingly, scholars are calling for greater
accountability for board decision-making with respect to human rights
issues; similarly, the potential harm associated with hydraulic frac-
turing deserves higher accountability.  In terms of criminal law, some
jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have extended elements
of the criminal law to influence corporate behavior, such as the con-
cept of corporate manslaughter;135 however, neither the law nor the
judiciary subscribes the same ethical obligations to corporate entities
that routinely attach to the concept of citizenship.
In addition, shareholder value theory has not resolved the agent-
principal relationship whereby management acts on behalf of the
shareholders.136  While the problems of this relationship have been
well rehearsed and are beyond the scope of this research, it is recog-
nized that shareholders have limited scope for directing the board, al-
lowing the board wide discretion to follow agendas that do not
necessarily maximize shareholder value.  In the United States, the
law and the judiciary further complicate this dilemma through the
broad application of the BJR, which protects the decisions of the board
from shareholder challenges as long as the board is able to identify a
business reason for taking such action.137 According to the BJR, a
court will not question the decisions of a company’s director if they
were made in good faith, with the care of a reasonably prudent person,
and in the belief the director was acting in the company’s best inter-
est.138  As a result, corporate entities and their managers are insu-
lated routinely from liability for decisions and policies that may
adversely affect shareholders as well as the local community and
other stakeholders.139  Professor Franklin A. Gevurtz has noted that
the Delaware courts have applied “the [BJR] in a highly deferential
manner to exonerate directors . . . .”140  Further, Professor Dibadj has
135. Celia Wells, Corporate Criminal Liability, CRIM. L. REV. 849, 853-62 (2014).
136. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 112.
137. Dibadj, supra note 125, at 484-85.
138. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corpo-
rate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2005).
139. See generally Sneirson, supra note 130, at 548-54.
140. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History
or A Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 101, 144 (2011).
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noted that “wide management discretion” under the BJR has led to
“results [that] have been, to put it kindly, less than stellar.”141  A
broader reading of the shareholder value theory should recognize that
concern for other stakeholders may significantly maximize share-
holder value, especially in the long-term.  Moreover, Professor Sneir-
son argues that corporate management pursuing policies that
consider a wide variety of stakeholders have little to fear in terms of
litigation since the broadness of the BJR means that “company deci-
sions, including sustainability-motivated decisions that depart from a
profit-maximizing objective, will withstand . . . challenges.”142  Re-
search that dismisses social issues is at best misleading and at worst a
red herring for courts that mechanically apply the BJR.  The funda-
mental problem with a narrow reading of the shareholder value the-
ory is that it fails to recognize the important impact that social factors
may have on shareholder value maximization and the destructive im-
pact of applying a broad BJR.  According to Professor Lee, “[t]he best
interests of the corporation is evidently not a formula that can be ap-
plied mechanically so as to yield a unique, incontestably correct deci-
sional outcome . . . .”143  Finally, the law and economics movement’s
narrow reading of case law inaccurately circumscribes the actions of
corporations as short-term profit maximization is not actually re-
quired by the corporate law.144  Above all, a growing body of research
argues that corporate law does not in fact “[impose] a legal require-
ment that corporate fiduciaries maximize shareholder wealth and es-
chew sustainable and socially responsible business practices.”145
In the United Kingdom, the common law has also followed a phi-
losophy of “shareholder primacy” when examining the nature of com-
panies and the role of officers and directors.  Seminal case law,
including Percival v. Wright,146 has defined the relationship between
shareholders and the board of directors.  Essentially, the common law
duties dictate that directors are to manage the company in the inter-
ests of all shareholders.147  Directors’ duties are to the company, not
to individual shareholders or others, with the objective of maximizing
141. Dibadj, supra note 125, at 515.
142. Sneirson, supra note 130, at 553.
143. Lee, supra note 124, at 149.
144. See Lynn Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 163 (2008).  Professor Stout notes: “In sum, whether gauged by corporate charters,
state corporation codes, or corporate case law, the notion that corporate law as a posi-
tive matter ‘requires’ companies to maximize shareholder wealth turns out to be spuri-
ous.” Id. at 172.
145. Sneirson, supra note 130, at 549.
146. [1902] 2 EWHC (ch) 421 (Eng.).
147. Daniel Attenborough, How Directors Should Act When Owing Duties to the
Companies’ Shareholders: Why We Need to Stop Applying Greenhalgh, 20 INT’L COM-
PANY & COM. L. REV. 339, 339 (2009).
2018] RESPONSIBILITY IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 595
shareholder wealth.148  However, through the Companies Act 2006,
Parliament broadened the duties of directors by codifying the common
law rules on directors’ duties in sections 170 to 177 as well as intro-
ducing the concept of “enlightened shareholder value.”  Under this ap-
proach, directors are “required to promote the success of the company
in the collective best interest of the shareholders, but in doing so they
will have to have regard to a wider range of factors, including the in-
terests of employees and the environment.”149  As Professor Andrew
Keay points out:
[T]he shareholder value theory does not provide any consis-
tent definition, [and] even though it gives the connotation of
being an objective criterion, it is malleable and can mean
many different things, and can be used to support or chal-
lenge “any management action by manipulating either the
test of profit maximization or the ‘facts’ to which the test is
applied.”150
Given the shortcomings of shareholder value theory, a broad
range of approaches which advocate CSR has emerged.151  Such mod-
els have provided more sustainable solutions and addressed the defi-
ciencies of shareholder value theory.  At the international level, the
United Nations Global Compact152 and the Global Reporting Initia-
tive153 are but two examples of supranational approaches to engage
“participants from business, community, labor, academic, and profes-
sional institutions . . . to demonstrate organizational commitment to
sustainable business practices.”154  Nonetheless, efforts to impose
such obligations through CSR initiatives often flounder as such are
frequently based in aspirational codes of conduct or too general as to
be required by the law or the courts.  Although an emphasis on CSR
can have a positive impact on businesses and society, Professor Gail
Henderson points out:
[T]here are . . . limits on what this particular form of private
transnational regulation can achieve[, and] . . . [s]ubstantial
148. Id.
149. 6 June 2006, Parl Deb HC (2006) col. 125 (UK).
150. Keay, supra note 106, at 376-77 (citing G. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1311 (1984)).
151. John Elkington’s “triple bottom line” approach has been particularly influential
in reorienting businesses to consider economic, environmental, and social justice fac-
tors. See JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST
CENTURY BUSINESS 2 (reprinted ed. 2002).
152. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2017).
153. See ABOUT GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
154. Kristen Rice, Freezing to Heat the Future: Streamlining the Planning and Mon-
itoring of Arctic Hydrocarbon Development, 24 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
REV. 391, 414 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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improvements in corporations’ environmental performance
will come about only by focusing on the source of the prob-
lem—corporations themselves—and imposing the legal obli-
gation to take into account environmental factors on
corporate boards of directors . . . .155
In addition, Professor Cynthia A. Williams queries whether “vol-
untary initiatives can fully solve concerns about corporate social ac-
countability, or, rather, whether they are primarily a strategy to
deflect mandatory regulation . . . [requiring] higher standards . . . .”156
Against these concerns, the remainder of this Article examines possi-
ble approaches to enhancing corporate sustainability in the hydraulic
fracturing industry.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING PROBLEMS
FACING THE INDUSTRY WITH RESPECT TO
DEFICIENCIES IN THE LAW
Models that stress shareholder value maximization will en-
courage corporations to pursue shale gas with the minimum legal
standards in order to maximize shareholder profits.  Current regula-
tions do not adequately protect communities from the externalities
caused by hydraulic fracturing.  Therefore, this Article argues for a
reorientation of the assumptions of shareholder value theory to in-
clude consideration of other factors and show more responsiveness to
CSR concerns.  In particular, this Article argues that: (1) focusing on
corporate governance guidelines could supplement inadequate govern-
ment regulation; (2) modern standards of citizenship should be ex-
tended to corporations as entities currently enjoying the rights but not
obligations of legal persons; and (3) engaging hydraulic fracturing
companies with local communities can build trust and minimize fu-
ture risks.  Through promoting corporate governance initiatives, CSR
charters, engagement with the local community and other stakehold-
ers, the hydraulic fracturing industry could help supplement the regu-
latory lacunae and help alleviate the concerns raised above.
A. FOCUSING ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES COULD
SUPPLEMENT INADEQUATE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Recent research has shown that just twenty corporate entities
have been responsible for almost thirty percent of greenhouse gas
155. Gail E. Henderson, Making Corporations Environmentally Sustainable: The
Limits of Responsible Investing, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1412, 1415 (2012).
156. Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas
Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 457, 462 (2004).
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emissions for the period 1751-2010.157  These corporations are bound
into a web of various stakeholders, including shareholders, employees,
management, customers, the local community, governments, and
other individuals and groups affected by the actions of these corpora-
tions.  While traditional notions of corporations place the maximiza-
tion of wealth as the basic purpose of a corporation as discussed
above,158 multinational corporations are under increasing pressure
from stakeholders to behave ethically and adopt sustainable poli-
cies.159  Scholars have wrestled with the question of enhancing corpo-
rate-law sustainability, with Professor Klaus J. Hopt pointing out that
requiring sustainability as a legal requirement would “disrupt central
tenets of modern corporate law” and “would also be difficult to en-
force . . . .”160  Therefore, reforms should include measures that are
more likely to be effective, such as encouraging adherence to corporate
governance codes as well as other industry codes of conduct.
Corporate governance broadly describes efforts to promote trans-
parency and responsibility in the way companies are controlled and
directed.161  The primary goals of good corporate governance include
enhancing the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of compa-
nies.  International corporate governance standards, such as those of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance (“OCED”),162 are a form of “soft” law,
formulated upon the recommendations of public and private actors.
Corporate governance guidelines may become binding through either
the adoption into law by states or the listing requirements of stock
exchanges.163  For example, the New York Stock Exchange has spe-
cific corporate governance standards required of its listed corpora-
tions.164  If these corporations fail to meet the requirements, they are
157. Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emis-
sions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 229, 237
(2014).
158. Sneirson, supra note 130, at 548 (“[T]he conventional view in law and business
[is] that corporations are to be managed for the sole purpose of maximizing shareholder
profits.”).
159. Williams, supra note 156, at 466-70.
160. Snierson, supra note 130, at 557.
161. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and
International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 6-7 (2011).
162. OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/
principles-corporate-governance.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
163. Hopt, supra note 161, at 14-15.
164. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A (2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selected
node=chp%5F1%5F4%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F.
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subject to delisting,165 which could have a devastating impact on their
stock value.  While corporate governance standards initially focused
on the relationship between management and shareholders, ethical
concerns increasingly affect the nature of corporate governance stan-
dards.  Similarly, corporate governance standards concerning fracking
could set guidelines “to minimize risk, mitigate harms, and maximize
benefits in pursuit of long-term growth and prosperity.”166  While
such standards could not replace national and local laws and regula-
tions, such private standards would serve not only to self-regulate the
main contributors to climate change but would also provide standards
of best practices that would encourage oil and gas companies to seek
the common good while identifying economically viable innovations to
address climate change.
In addition, the law should work to recognize and improve best
standards formulated by the hydraulic fracturing industry.  For exam-
ple, the American Petroleum Institute (“API”)167 has formulated a
number of codes of practice that comprehensively address practices in
the energy industry, including fracking.  While critics may argue that
the API’s standards focus on the interests of the energy companies at
the expense of other stakeholders, its members, representing “produc-
ers, refiners, suppliers, pipeline operators and marine transport-
ers”168 nonetheless possess the technical expertise to formulate safe
and effective practices.  International guidelines, such as the Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises promulgated by the OCED, ad-
dress a wide range of ethical issues related to international
businesses.169  Yet, such guidelines depend on multinational coopera-
tion and ultimately on the willingness of corporations to adhere to
such ethical guidelines.  International standards often set general as-
pirational goals and cannot fundamentally alter the concept and the
personality of a corporation in a particular jurisdiction.  Despite the
weaknesses of disclosure as a regulatory system, further mandatory
and voluntary disclosure standards should be encouraged.
While purely voluntary codes of conduct are desirable, Professor
Sneirson argues that “[a] middle ground between mandatory reforms
and voluntary action can work to establish the suggested behaviors as
new norms supporting sustainability and exert subtle pressure on
165. See generally Andreas Charitou, Christodoulos Louca & Nikos Vafeas, Boards,
Ownership Structure, and Involuntary Delisting from the New York Stock Exchange, 26
J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 249 (2007).
166. Fershee, supra note 88, at 487.
167. See generally ENERGY API, http://www.api.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
168. ENERGY API, ORGANIZATION, http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpa
ges/about-api/api-overview (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
169. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.
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firms . . . .”170  Accordingly, mechanisms could require the adoption of
sustainability standards much like those required under securities
laws in the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to
corporate codes of conduct,171 allowing businesses to still “pursue fi-
nancial goals” but  “treading as lightly as possible on the earth and its
natural resources” while “supporting . . . local communities . . . .”172
Considering the U.K. Corporate Governance Code “comply or ex-
plain” requirements for corporate governance standards,173 the U.S.
Sarbanes Oxley’s code of ethics rules,174 or the U.S. Dodd-Frank’s con-
flict minerals disclosure requirements,175 similar mechanisms to pro-
mote sustainable behavior could be adapted to the hydraulic
fracturing industry.  In particular, these could require companies en-
gaged in hydraulic fracturing to publicly disclose their due diligence,
engagement with local communities, adherence to highest industry
standards, and commitment to monitoring the safety of their opera-
tions during development, extraction, and post-production.  Not only
would such proposals help reduce the detrimental impact on local
communities and the environment, these measures would also allow
companies to publicly document their adherence to best practices and
industry standards, thereby reducing possible liability for unforeseen
damage.  Corporate governance standards themselves are far from a
panacea; indeed, their effectiveness relies on “a balanced interplay be-
tween distinct internal and external control devices.”176  However,
they provide a concrete enforcement mechanism that has been effec-
tive in other areas of the law.
B. MODERN STANDARDS OF CITIZENSHIP SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO
CORPORATIONS AS ENTITIES CURRENTLY ENJOYING THE RIGHTS
BUT NOT OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL PERSONS
Many companies recognize that a number of considerations other
than maximizing short-term profits actually contribute to their me-
dium- and long-term viability.  Further, the concept of CSR occupies
an increasingly important role in affecting corporate behavior, with a
170. Sneirson, supra note 130, at 557-58.
171. Id. at 557.
172. Id. at 543.
173. Marc T. Moore, The End of “Comply or Explain” in UK Corporate Governance?,
60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 85, 86 (2009).
174. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7264 (2002).
175. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(p) (2010).
176. Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe—Recent Develop-
ments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, and Italy, 1 EUROPEAN COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 135, 139 (2004).
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growing interest in “socially responsible conduct”177 and greater en-
gagement with stakeholders.  Against this background, there is an un-
precedented opportunity to engage multinational corporations and
their stakeholders in efforts to develop other forms of effective and
sustainable governance.  Corporate law sets forth the manner in
which legal entities enjoy legal personhood with accompanying rights
and responsibilities.  The United States Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized that “[a] corporation is an artificial being, indivisible, intangi-
ble, and existing only in contemplation of law.”178  As discussed above,
the dominant view in the legal corporate academy suggests that such
legal existence should be blind to any obligation beyond the maximiza-
tion of shareholder wealth.
Indeed, limited liability companies offer significant protection for
corporate entities although the concept poses a significant obstacle to
“accountability for human rights impacts . . . .”179  However, in Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,180 the United States Supreme Court
seemed to suggest that corporations could be liable for violations of
human rights violations.181  According to Professor Franklin A.
Gevurtz, “if a company’s production significantly damages the envi-
ronment, one cannot measure the impact of the company’s activity on
the total wealth of society without subtracting the damage to the envi-
ronment in the calculation.”182  Beyond the considerations above, the
legal personality of corporations and the judiciary’s preference for im-
posing a shareholder value theory should be addressed in legal re-
forms, which modify the legal personality of corporations to take into
account the externalities they cause as well as reduce the excessive
risks boards take as a result of limited liability.  In the United King-
dom, section 172 of the Companies Act of 2006 requires directors to act
with an “enlightened shareholder value” approach; however, much
discretion is left to the “director of a company. . . [to] act in a way he
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of
177. Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the
Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 287 (2005).
178. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
179. Ho, supra note 133, at 161.
180. 569 U.S. 108 (2014).
181. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 110 (2014).
182. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using Comparative and Transnational Corporate Law to
Teach Corporate Social Responsibility, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 39,
40 (2011).  Professor Gevurtz further explains:
[T]o assume that corporate law—the laws governing the selection, duties, and
liabilities of those in charge of corporations and of the owners of the corpora-
tion—is irrelevant to these concerns is a bit like assuming that the laws gov-
erning the election of representatives in a democracy are irrelevant to the
policies the government will ultimately follow.
Id. (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Re-
sponsibilities, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 3, 45-46 (2007)).
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the company. . . .”183  Without further specificity, it is unlikely that
the full range of shareholder interests would be considered at the
same level as maximizing profit for shareholders.  Further legal re-
forms are necessary to remedy this deficiency.
C. ENGAGING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING COMPANIES WITH LOCAL
COMMUNITIES CAN BUILD TRUST AND MINIMIZE FUTURE RISKS
According to Professor Schumacher and Professor Morrissey, high
profile environmental damage has “fueled public suspicion of the oil
and gas industry,” which has largely responded by depicting “these
incidents as highly unusual” while the “public however, perceives the
industry as secretive, resistant to reasonable safeguards and over-
sight, and callous toward local populations.”184  In particular, firms
engaged in hydraulic fracturing “must be publicly transparent about
managing their environmental footprint and social impacts, and en-
gage with key community stakeholders to earn and maintain their so-
cial license to operate” by disclosing the actions they take “to minimize
risks, acknowledg[ing] . . . challenges and failures, and clearly
defin[ing] steps to continually improve operations.”185  Finally, Profes-
sor Henderson points out that “making corporate activity environmen-
tally sustainable is less a matter of blanket prohibitions or universal
standards of conduct and more a matter of managing the environmen-
tal impacts of economic activity on a case-by-case basis.”186
The United Kingdom framework promotes the engagement of hy-
draulic fracturing companies with local communities in both the plan-
ning and development stages.187  Additionally, U.K. practices entitle
local communities that host hydraulic fracturing sites to £100,000
worth of benefits as well as one percent of revenues from produc-
tion.188  While there has been criticism of these financial incen-
tives,189 they nonetheless represent a tangible mechanism whereby
local communities may benefit financially from hydraulic fracturing
operations.190  Nonetheless, monitoring of these commitments and the
183. United Kingdom Companies Act 2006, C. 2 (UK).
184. Schumacher & Morrissey, supra note 8, at 254-55.
185. Extracting the Facts:  An Investor Guide to Disclosing Risk from Hydraulic
Fracturing Operations, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP. 3, http://www.iehn.org/docu-
ments/frackguidance.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
186. Henderson, supra note 155, at 1424-25.
187. See Guidance on Fracking, supra note 44.
188. Id.
189. See generally Damien Short & Anna Szolucha, Fracking Lancashire: The Plan-
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activities of hydraulic fracturing firms in local communities will actu-
ally identify whether this level of support is adequate in light of the
potential negative impact on local communities.191  Indeed, such mon-
itoring is required under relevant U.K. practices.  Further, the U.K.
government has expressed a commitment to creating a shale wealth
fund for the benefit of host communities of hydraulic fracturing activi-
ties.192  However, the standards and commitments are premised on
voluntary charters; therefore, it is too early to predict their effective-
ness.193  If successful, they may represent a set of specific actions that
may more effectively engage host communities.  As the true impact of
these initiatives become known, host communities across the United
States should have the opportunity to demand similar commitments
from hydraulic fracturing firms operating in their local areas.  Never-
theless, even if these initiatives increase the engagement of local com-
munities while rewarding them financially, they cannot substitute for
a reorienting of the expectations of corporate citizenship as argued in
this Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current laws and regulations are inadequate to ensure sus-
tainability and safety in the hydraulic fracturing industry, and effec-
tive governance in the area is necessary to protect against unintended
consequences as well as to encourage promising innovation.  While
there is certainly a role for governments and other authorities to im-
prove effective governance mechanisms, corporate law itself should
also be an area of reform.  A substantial body of research identifies the
limits of the shareholder value theory, arguing instead that a stake-
holder approach can maximize shareholder returns while providing
sustainability for companies, their stakeholders, and the environ-
ment.  The risks associated with hydraulic fracturing illustrate the
importance of reorienting legal scholarship away from the dominant
shareholder value theory to more sustainable models.  Against these
concerns, this Article calls for a fundamental reform of the citizenship
of corporations, which could help ensure safe, sustainable energy pro-
duction for both shareholders and other stakeholders.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See generally Matthew Cotton, Fair Fracking? Ethics and Environmental Jus-
tice in United Kingdom Shale Gas Policy and Planning, 22 LOC. ENV’T 185 (2017).
